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Myers: SMS Derived vs. Public Perceived Risk in Aviation Technology Acceptance

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), major
airlines, and similar organizations that utilize a Safety Management System (SMS)
are periodically implementing aviation technology changes. Typically, SMS
derived and public perceived risk comprise two different processes with dissimilar
influencing factors between the two processes. Organizational or public perceived
risk level is the attitude derived from examining possible hazards and the
probability of those hazards occurring to the organization, individual, equipment,
society, or environment. The disparity between the organizational and public
processes often causes public technology acceptance reluctance or rejection. Thus,
the purpose of this paper is to identify and examine the processes and influencing
factors that cause this disparity to better facilitate future aviation technology
implementation.
There have been numerous research studies examining technology
acceptance with risk perception research roots going back to the 1960s to research
the reasons for public reluctance or rejection (Sjöberg, 2000). Some examples of
risk perception studies include the Wildavsky, & Dake (1990) study of theories of
risk perception, the Whitfield, Rosa, Dan, & Dietz (2009) study of perceptions
related to nuclear power and the Townsend (2013) study of the perception of risk
in the public sector. Gupta, Fischer and Frewer (2012) reviewed 292 technology
acceptance studies between 1977 and 2008 finding 31 determinant factors that
influenced technology acceptance. Of the 31 factors, perceived risk was the most
frequently occurring variable and the one that was investigated the most in those
studies. Clothier, Greer, Greer and Mehta (2015) and La Porte and Metlay (1975a)
also agree on the significance of perceived risk when compared to other factors.
Dobbie and Brown (2014) echo the sentiment that perceived risk is a hindrance in
technology acceptance. In their study of an attempted implementation of an
integrated Australian urban water management approach, they found some
similarities in determining factors between practitioners and the public. However,
the two distinct evaluation processes of those factors resulted in different
perceptions of risk between the two groups and created a public risk-averse culture
(Dobbie & Brown, 2014).
Aviation technology innovation has progressed from the first flight of the
Wright Brothers to landing on the moon in just 63 years (Lawrence, 2014).
However, disparity between the SMS and public processes coupled with dissimilar
influencing factors has, at times, slowed or halted technology implementation.
There are several historical examples to illustrate this. One example is Robert
Goddard, a rocket pioneer, who in the mid-1930s developed a rocket with movable
vanes and rudders. The U.S. government, a consolidated voice of public sentiment,
had no interest until it was realized that the Germans had a sizable lead in rocket
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development when they became a threat some 20 years later during WWII
(Lawrence, 2014). More recently, both chemical and nuclear technologies have
evoked large public perceived risk assessments, essentially creating progress
stagnation. Because of this stagnation, it has been difficult to find landfills,
incinerators, and other chemical facility sites and virtually impossible to dispose of
the wastes from chemical and nuclear operations and processes much to the dismay
of technical experts (Slovic, 1997). More specifically, nuclear waste disposal has
been a 30-year struggle, largely due to the public perception as being victims rather
than beneficiaries of the technology. This resulted in a lack of trust in the
government and an increased perceived risk by the public. As a result, progress
implementing the Yucca Mountain project, the only proposed nuclear waste site,
has been stopped, hence thwarting the expansion of nuclear power production
(Slovic, Layman, & Flynn, 1991).
Future technologies requiring technology implementation and; therefore,
acceptance continue to be explored such as NASA’s movement toward a one-pilot
airline cockpit. Even today, NASA realizes the effect of perceived risk, identifying
it as one of three significant barriers to success (Warwick, 2013).
The Problem
The problem is twofold. First, SMS organizations, when implementing
technology, use a reactive versus a proactive approach. Second, they do not grasp
the magnitude of the public’s perceived risk due to lack knowledge of the public
perceived risk derivation process and influencing factors. These two elements cause
a disparity between organizational and public perceived risk levels resulting in
technology implementation being slowed or halted. More specifically, the
introduction of new technology involves some level of SMS defined risk to the
public that is viewed as acceptable by the organization. However, the public may
perceive the SMS defined risk at a more negative level than the implementing
organization using SMS; thus, creating a disparity (Hunter, 2001). While perceived
risk is recognized to some degree as an influencing factor in technology acceptance
in today’s society, technology implementation is attempted concurrently with
addressing public perceived risk in a reactive versus proactive approach. This
reactive approach coupled with not grasping the magnitude of the impact of
negative public perceived risk on technology acceptance has resulted in undesired
end-states. By understanding SMS derived versus the public risk assessment
processes and associated influencing factors of each, and if necessary, the
methodology to change that perception once formed, public perceived risk can be
targeted for either elimination or minimization to facilitate technology
implementation. Additionally, using a proactive type approach, some public
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support predictability can be achieved when implementing new technology. Thus,
toward this goal, SMS and public risk derivation processes, major SMS and public
perceived risk influencing factors, along with the ability to influence public
perceived risk once an attitude is formed, are examined in a literature review with
conclusions and recommendations formed.
A literature review process was used to summarize previous studies, inform
the reader of the current status of the subject area, to identify relations,
contradictions, and gaps in the literature, and finally to suggest the next research
steps. The process used to derive the information for the literature review was
conducted using the Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Hunt Library databases
and Google Scholar by using public perceived risk and perceived risk with
technology acceptance in the search function. Initially, using public perceived risk
in the search criteria yielded a total of 1,158 results from the Hunt Library
databases. After a quick scan of the sources, the subject matter was surmised to be
too broad in scope, because of non-relevant subject areas such as food, etc. After
the search criteria were narrowed to include technology acceptance in the search
function and peer reviewed selected as criteria, the results were narrowed to 738
sources. Sources were then screened to omit those that could not be obtained, those
that did not relate to technology acceptance or perceived risk, and those that did not
include aviation, nuclear, information technology, or other potentially controversial
technical areas. Google Scholar initially yielded 705 results, but the subject areas
were too broad in scope, because of non-relevant subject matter, similar to what the
Hunt Library search results yielded. After technology acceptance had been included
in the search criteria, the search results yielded the final sources needed for the
literature review.
Literature Review
SMS Derived Risk
Derivation Process. To be able to bridge the differences between SMS and
public perceived risk, it is first necessary to understand how the SMS risk
assessment or perceived risk is derived. The SMS process starts with defining risk.
Stolzer and Goglia (2015) use expected losses mated with the probability of
those losses occurring to define risk. Parnell, Driscoll, and Henderson (2011)
parallel this definition stating risk is a probabilistic event that when it occurs, causes
undesired changes in technical performance, cost or schedule of events. Since risk
has been defined, the next major factor to understand is safety risk management
(SRM).
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In SMS or system design processes (SDP), SRM is used to identify, assess,
and implement risk controls to reduce system variance caused by risks. SRM within
the SMS construct uses subject matter experts (SME) to dissect processes, identify
hazards, construct a safety risk probability table, build a risk severity table, define
levels of risk, and create a risk matrix. SMS perceived risks are those thought to be
relevant in the processes used in an organization utilizing SMS. They are derived
from risk matrixes based on the overall severity of risks, taking into account
probability and severity levels. Risk controls are then implemented to reduce risk
level to an acceptable level. It should be noted that acceptable does not mean
necessarily reducing the risk level to zero. These perceived risks and associated risk
controls are then presented to management in a cost-benefit analysis approach for
implementation decisions (Stolzer & Goglia, 2015). Parnell et al., (2011) describe
a similar SMS risk derivation process in identifying, assessing, and mitigating risk.
While they use a similar approach, slightly different tools are used such as a risk
register, an impact on project table, and a probability impact table. Both risk
management processes described are mostly objective in nature, accomplished by
experts within an organization, and comprise expert perceived risks or a
technological approach (Choi, 2013).
While the SRM process is mostly objective in nature, because of having a
defined process, there is still subjectivity introduced into the process, because
individuals are involved. Therefore, emotions can influence the risk assessment
levels (Slovic, 1997). This inherent subjectivity when assigning levels of severity
and probability can prove detrimental when one individual or a group of individuals
dominate the SRM process potentially skewing results.
Major Influencing Factors of SMS Derived Risk. In conjunction with
understanding how SMS perceived risk is derived, it is also important to grasp the
significant influencing factors on the SRM process to have a total understanding of
how an organization using SMS derives perceived risk. From a systems engineering
perspective in an organization that utilizes SMS, the International Council on
Systems Engineering recognizes four risk elements or influencing factors on the
process that should be considered when making a system decision. These risk
elements include technical, cost, schedule, and programmatic risk. Technical risk
is the possibility that the system will not meet a required technical objective or
functional requirement. Cost risk is the possibility that the system will exceed the
programmed budget. Schedule risk is the possibility that the system will exceed the
proposed timeline and associated milestones. Programmatic risk is the possibility
of external factors affecting the development and/or deployment of a system
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(Parnell et al., 2011). These four elements used in the derivation process constitute
the foundation of the SMS perceived risk assessment.
Public Perceived Risk
Derivation Process. To be able to mitigate the differences between SMS
and public perceived risk to facilitate technology acceptance, one must not only
have a good understanding of SMS derivation of perceived risk and influencing
factors, but also a good understanding of how public perceived risk is derived and
influencing factors. Required knowledge starts with understanding the two levels
of perceived risk and cognitive process that the public uses to derive perceived
risk.
Dobbie and Brown (2014) distinguish two different levels of perceived
risks: expert and layman. While SMS derived perceived risk, otherwise known as
expert perceived risk, seems like an all-encompassing risk management approach,
being mostly objective in nature, perceived risk derived by the public is mostly
based on subjective norms including emotions, and is termed layman perceived risk
(Dobbie & Brown, 2014). Young and Laughery (1994) complement this finding
advocating that people use a simple, routine method to derive risk perception that
remains identical regardless of technologies being considered. The process is
relatively simple with perceived risk derivation occurring in an individual
stakeholder’s mind without a formal SRM process. A stakeholder is either an
organization or individual who has a vested interest in the technology being
implemented (Parnell, Driscoll, &Henderson, 2011). In the context of this paper,
stakeholders are the individuals who make up the public realm.
Major Influencing Factors of Public Perceived Risk. Tied to the public
perceived risk derivations are the risk elements and associated influencing factors
considered in the public stakeholder’s cognitive process to derive perceived risk.
Thus, understanding the elements and individual influencing factors coupled with
the previously discussed public perceived risk derivation process allows an
educated gap analysis comparison between SMS and public perceived risk. As
discussed, the process the individual public stakeholder uses to derive perceived
risk is relatively simple. However, complication ensues when examining the basic
elements and the numerous, often subjective, influencing individual factors in an
individual’s decision process, which at times, may seem irrational.
Risk elements. Six identified elements form the system analysis framework
of public perceived risk and include (a) security, (b) financial, (c) physical, (d)
social, (e) time, and (f) performance risk. Security risk is the potential threat to an
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individual’s security. Financial risk is the likelihood of monetary loss. Physical
risk is potential harm to an individual. Social risk refers to potential society
disapproval. Time risk is time loss or inconvenience potential. Performance risk is
system malfunction potential. These elements are then applied as applicable for the
technology studied (Lee, 2009). While a lone individual considering these six
elements has little effect on technology acceptance, individuals make up
organizations, society groups, industry, and government which can have a profound
impact on technology acceptance. While the six elements influence system
analysis, individuals vary. Therefore, it is also necessary to study the variables that
influence an individual’s risk perception formation to have a clear understanding
of the public perceived risk influences.
Lack of trust. The first major influencing variable is lack of trust. In public
perceived risk studies, lack of trust in the organization using SMS to implement the
technology has surfaced as one of the most common influencing factors. There are
several contributing factors that researchers have identified as contributing to lack
of trust. Whitfield, Rosa, Dan, & Dietz (2009), Townsend (2013), and Gupta et al.
(2012) found that increased trust in government institutions decreased public
perceived risk. An additional significant finding was that those individuals with
traditional values have more trust in overseeing organizations. Trust is also related
to age in that younger people are typically more trusting than older people. One of
the biggest mistrust contributors is the perception that the parent organization
utilizing SMS is allowing unacceptably high risk (Slovic, 1997). Additionally, in
the public’s eyes, trust is founded on the organization’s sensitivity to their concerns,
which can be solely based on emotions, not correct factual information (Lester,
2000). Once the public trust is lost, it is very difficult to regain. Therefore, the focus
of the organization using SMS must be on retaining it from the start (Petts, Homan,
Breakwell, & Barnett (2002).
Catastrophic events and mismanagement are other examples of factors that
can initiate or deepen an already heightened feeling of public perceived risk or lack
of trust. The Three Mile Island power plant partial nuclear meltdown in 1979 is an
example of a catastrophic event that had a lasting negative impact on public trust
(Whitfield et al., 2009). An example of mismanagement with lasting detrimental
effects is that of the weapons plant in Hanford, Washington which in the 1940s and
50s, released large amounts of radiation contamination into the local ground water
which was unknown and undisclosed to the public until recently (Slovic et al.,
1991).
Amount of control. Control is another major influencing factor on
perceived risk. Lester (2000) states that the basis of the public accepting risk is how
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much control they have over implementing the technology. Further, he advocates
that when technology is implemented without public involvement, there is a public
perception of a lack of control since they were not involved in the decision-making
process. This lack of control results in increased public perceived risk. Nordgren,
Pligt, and Harreveld (2007) and Du, Keil, Mathiassen, Shen and Tiwana (2007)
agree with Lester concluding that level of control is a major determinant of risk
perception level. The more control individuals have, the lower the risk perception.
Thus, facilitating technology acceptance through persuasion is easier when the
public feels like they have a valid choice of options and are part of the process.
Petts et al. (2002) echo these sentiments.
Knowledge and experience. Knowledge of and experience with the
technology being also assessed greatly influences public perceived risk. This
conclusion is derived from the fact that individual knowledge and experience have
a significant impact on individual mental models that use cognitive information
processing to form levels of public perceived risk (Dobbie & Brown, 2014).
Sjöberg (1999), and Gupta et al. (2012) found that people with more knowledge
about the topic or technology tend to rate risk lower and vice versa. Wildavsky &
Dake (1990) reason that this is true, because with knowledge, people will
understand the technology being implemented more. In contrast, Visschers,
Meertens, Passchier, and DeVries (2007) stated a “construction-integration” (p,
716) cognitive process derives new information from the text by constructing a
rough picture with fill-in information to form a representation. Given that, the
mental representation in an individual’s mind is only as accurate as the information
on which it is based. Related, Whitfield et al. (2009) and Wildavsky and Dake
(1990) found people with a lower education level had a higher level of perceived
risk. Conversely, Townsend (2013) and Wildavsky and Dake1990) found that
people with college degrees rated themselves less at risk than lower educated
respondents. Additionally, they found an influencing link between education level
and attitude. Significantly, regarding experience, risk perception is derived from an
overall experience level that rarely includes experience for the risk in question
(Rogers, 1997). Realistic risk perception occurs when people have indirect or direct
experience with the risks involved; otherwise, they must rely on other factors
(Sjöberg, 2000).
Individual norms/attitudes. Individual norms created by attitudes,
individual beliefs and values form the individual public stakeholder’s core of
perceived risk. Thus, in most instances, differences in risk perception between
experts and laypersons can be largely attributed to individual norms (Dobbie &
Brown, 2014). Attitudes form the basis of individual norms and are driven by
perceived risk and trust in managing organizations. Once formed, attitudes are
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difficult to change unless individual influencing circumstances change. A good
example is nuclear power where public resistance to its usage is high even today.
However, even with high public resistance, 42% of respondents said nuclear power
would be acceptable if there were an electricity shortage (Whitfield et al., 2009).
A major influencing factor on individual norms is the prevalent attitude a public
stakeholder holds. Wildavsky and Dake (1990) identify two prevalent attitudes of
risk averseness and risk taking that bias perceived risk. People who are less willing
to take risks are defined as risk averse, and those who are more willing to take risks
are defined as risk taking.
Individual values. Risk-taking is often a function of the values of an
individual. Whitfield et al. (2009), Gupta et al. (2012), and Sjöberg (2000) found
a strong correlation between people with traditional values and greater technology
acceptance support resulting in less public perceived risk. Those with an unselfish
concern for others had less technology acceptance support and a higher public level
of perceived risk. Also, with an unfamiliar subject area, Sjöberg (2000) found
individuals fall back on norms and; therefore, it can be concluded that risk
perception is largely a reflection of individual values. Thus, people rating new
technology see mostly good in technology they like and mostly bad things in
technology they do not like (Sjöberg, 2000).
Culture theory. A major influence on individual internal beliefs that form
public perceived risk is the culture theory. The 15-year-old risk perception culture
theory postulates people fall into one of four categories governing individual
internal beliefs and risk rating perception: hierarchists, individualists, egalitarians,
and fatalists (Sjöberg, 2000). Choi (2013) and Wildavsky & Dake (1990) further
define the categories.
Hiearchists rate factors with the highest impact on social order as most
dangerous. Individualists consider factors affecting individual freedom the most
dangerous. Sanquist, Mahy & Morris (2008) echoes the individual freedom aspect.
Egalitarians view factors affecting technology and environment as the highest risk.
Finally, fatalists are powerless and willing to accept whatever fate risks impose.
Cultural factors. The next major influences on public perceived risk are
cultural factors. In conjunction with the four categories, public acceptance, and
perception levels vary in different countries due to differing cultural factors
(Clothier et. al, 2015; Choi, 2013). As part of the culture influence, social groups
form a framework that is a major influence when individual public stakeholders
compare their perceived risk ratings to family or other people in the social network
(Sjöberg, 2000). Moussaïd (2013) supports this finding that individual risk
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judgments are trended towards individuals in the proximity to the social network
which exhibits a strong influence on them.
To be successful in influencing the public’s perceived risk level, it is
essential to acknowledge the diverse risk perceptions of public stakeholders and to
realize that even within the same group, it may difficult to facilitate implementation
(Dobbie & Brown, 2014, La Porte & Metlay, 1975b). In fact, within the same
group, some people may be indifferent and tranquil while others are very upset
about perceived risk making it a very dynamic situation to deal with (Sjöberg,
2000).
Seidl, Moser, Stauffacher, & Krütli (2013) expand on this, listing four
possible opinion clusters within a group which includes (a) risk-focused - rates risk
high and benefit very low, (b) ambivalent – shows high ratings on both benefit and
risk, (c) benefit-focused – rates benefit high and risk very low, and (d) indifferent –
risk and benefit ratings are both at the moderate level, not feeling strongly either
way.
As Moussaïd (2013) argues that there are several possibilities of social
groupings including consensus, polarization, and clustering that may be faced by
those attempting to persuade the public. Consensus occurs when people agree and
support a general opinion. Polarization occurs when two opposed population views
emerge and co-exist. Clustering occurs when different groups form with likeminded opinions (Moussaïd, 2013). La Porte and Metlay (1975a) believe that
polarization is prevalent in society and; therefore, many technological issues will
be in the political arena. In other words, through polarization, people choose a path
to support their way of life (Wildavsky & Dake1990).
Media communication. Media communication is another influencing factor
on public perceived risk. The most common types of media communication include
pictures and text communication which can be very influential in forming public
perceived risk. Pictures affect perceived risk by creating a cognitive image often
accompanied times by strong emotions. For example, nuclear war images
negatively affected perceived risk regarding nuclear power (Slovic et al., 1991).
Clothier et al. (2015) and Sanquist et al. (2008) found that media communication
can be very influential in forming perceived risk opinions, especially when there is
little subject knowledge. Moussaïd (2013) supports this premise stating that
individuals often seek media information to fill knowledge gaps with the amount
dictated by existing knowledge. Sjöberg (2000) echoes this but rates it less
significant compared to other factors.
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When text media is presented by an organization utilizing SMS,
terminology is important, because it often invokes negative connotations, thus
increasing perceived risk. For example, nuclear waste disposal terms such as dump,
nuclear, or waste have produced negative results. For some people, just the word
nuclear invokes negative images of nuclear war with associated effects while
invoking a dread or fear factor (Slovic et al., 1991). Also, terminology presented in
one location may not be appropriate in another (Petts et al., 2002). Interestingly,
Clothier et al. (2015) contrarily found no link between terminology and perceived
risk. Simply presenting media in the wrong context can also present problems. The
influence of incorrect context was demonstrated by a hypothetical lung cancer study
based on choosing between two therapies. When the presentation context of the two
therapy choices was changed, results dramatically changed dropping from 44% to
18% of those choosing one therapy over the other (Slovic, 1997). This is known as
affect heuristic, because if people are upset, they do not think rationally. The other
way to describe the effect is how people feel will determine how they think
(Greenberg & Lowrie, 2014; Gupta et al., 2012). Townsend (2013) describes loss
aversion bias as another phenomenon framing influence. That is, to rate risk
associated with failure higher than associated benefits with success. This bias
instills a natural resistance to change that must be overcome (Townsend, 2013). A
related significant finding is people associate unknown with known risks to find a
relationship based on experience they can understand. Thus, occasionally people
use vaguely related or non-related risks to derive opinions. There are four reasons
for this that include (a) grasping consequences and severity, (b) to show that other
risks have been tolerated, (c) to illustrate there are also benefits to risks, and (d) to
show that risks can be resolved (Visschers et al., 2007).
Gender. Gender is the last major influencing factor. Concerning gender,
Whitfield et al. (2009) in their nuclear power study, found that women are riskaverse and have a higher level of perceived risk than men. Dobbie and Brown
(2014) and Townsend (2013) agree with this assertion.
Age. For age, Joyce, Ferguson, & Weinstein (2009) in a study of Mars
missions determined that school children were more likely to have a higher
perceived risk level than adults primarily due to lack of life experiences and young
people are more likely to change their values and beliefs than their adult
counterparts.
Changing Public Stakeholder Perceived Risk Once an Attitude is formed
Once formed, public perceived risk changes very slowly even when new
information is introduced by an organization using SMS (Dobbie & Brown, 2014).
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Many attempts to change an already formed attitude failed primarily because the
public interrelationship was not handled properly with community acceptance
either ignored or diminished. One example was the proposed nuclear waste site at
Yucca Mountain, Nevada which was briefly discussed earlier. In this instance, the
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) selected the Yucca Mountain site as the only
candidate to store nuclear waste assuming the effort would be successful. However,
the people of Nevada convinced the state legislature to pass an assembly bill
prohibiting storage of nuclear waste in Nevada. Additionally, a public poll indicated
that 80.1% thought the state “should do all it can to stop the repository” (Slovic,
Layman, & Flynn, 1991, p. 1). The Yucca Mountain incident illustrates the ultimate
power of the public’s perceived risk of being able to stop technology
implementation. Therefore, when technology is being implemented, experts should
strive for a mutual understanding of public perceived risks to facilitate acceptance
(Lester, 2000).
Public interaction viewed as an opportunity. Public interaction with an
organization that utilizes SMS should be viewed as an opportunity rather than an
obligation. That is, communication should be focused on influence versus
information, and facts not elevated over the public’s feelings. Opportunity means
going beyond minimal regulation requirements to build community rapport. Focus
is needed on persuasion rather than just presenting facts which mean being personal
versus technical and listening to subjective reason. Persuasion is driven by
emotional, not technical response and involves basic steps (Lester, 2000). This
methodology includes (a) understanding public thinking, (b) building credibility by
showing concern for citizens, (c) confronting public perceptions and feelings by
validating emotions, (d) using one-on-one meetings with the staunchest opponents,
(e) tempering the amount of information with the need for information, and (f)
involving the public in planning and implementation (Lester, 2000). Zwik (2005)
suggest that perceived risk initially derived by the public is often forgotten a short
time later. This phenomenon is known as the “switching effect” which reinforces
Lester’s point of viewing public interaction as an opportunity to change public
perceived risk.
Trust restoration. To be able to change public perceived risk, a
fundamental requirement is trust restoration. Trust is built on two-way
communication, transparency and tight risk controls. This is especially true when
an organization that utilizes SMS is implementing new technology as individuals
have little subject knowledge regarding complex technical systems (Dobbie &
Brown, 2014). Once trust has been destroyed, long incident-free periods are
required to recover. Nuclear examples discussed earlier are good examples of this.
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To address this, trust restoration must be given priority by increasing public
involvement in the decision-making process (Slovic et al., 1991).
Public participation. An organization that uses SMS and excludes public
participation is often viewed by the public as one attempting to hide critical facts
(Lester, 2000). Thus, some researchers advocate more public participation in the
SRM process since doing so provides the needed elements of trust and control
(Lester, 2000, Slovic et al. 1991). It also allows more democratic decision-making,
improves technical assessment relevance, and facilitates public acceptance (Slovic,
1997). However, this approach is not without drawbacks. Public representatives
involved in the SRM process for long periods may be out of touch with public
wants. Additionally, care must be taken that public representatives do not have a
biased personal agenda versus representing the public as a whole. Finally, to be
relevant contributors in the SRM process, those involved as public stakeholders
require extensive training for unfamiliar jargon and new material (Rogers, Sharp,
& Preece, 2011).
Communication. Communication from an organization using SMS to the
public is another major facet of changing public stakeholder perceived risk. There
are several communication methods such as broadcast media, printed information,
and face-to-face interaction. Clothier et al. (2015), found media to be very
influential in individual perceived risk when little is known about the subject.
Media timing is critical, though, because once perceived risk attitudes are formed,
media has little effect. Therefore, it is imperative that proactive media include a
balance of applications, capabilities, risks, and benefits to be effective in perceived
risk forming stages (Clothier et al., 2015). The second media form is printed
material designed to inform the public about unknown risks ideally spanning the
gap between expert risk and public or layman perceived risk similar to an SMS gap
analysis (Visschers et al., 2007). Dobbie and Brown, (2014) agree, but instead use
the theoretical mental model approach. If media or printed information fails, then
using face-to-face communication may be the most effective (Lester, 2000).
Ultimately, the risk communication goal should be to garner and incorporate public
risk perception information into the risk assessment decisions of the organization
utilizing SMS (Rogers, 1997).
Conclusions
Research has shown, and history has proven, that perceived risk is a
significant negative variable affecting technology acceptance success (Clothier,
Greer, Greer and Mehta, 2015; Dobbie and Brown, 2014; Gupta, Fischer, and
Frewer, 2012; La Porte and Metlay, 1975a; Sjöberg, 2000). More specifically, the
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disparity between SMS and public stakeholder processes coupled with dissimilar
influencing factors has, at times, frequently slowed or halted technology
implementation. Five other major conclusions can be drawn when comparing SMS
and public perceived risk that must be considered as well to ensure acceptance
success.
First, perceived risk derived by organizational experts utilizing SMS is
fundamentally different than perceived risk derived by individuals. SMS derived
risk is mostly objective in nature, because of proven processes with some
subjectivity, because individuals are involved. However, individual perceived risk
is just the opposite being mostly subjective in nature derived solely by the
individual with some objectivity. Because of this, often SMS experts view their
process as the ultimate solution, while in the public’s eyes, their solution is just as
relevant. Thus, an organization using SMS must realize their solution has flaws,
and that the public solution is relevant. Therefore, persuasion versus just factual
information must be used to garner public support for the technology that is
implemented.
Second, when SMS and public influencing elements are compared, there
are both similarities and differences. The similar elements between SMS and the
public include cost and financial as well as technical and performance. The unique
elements to SMS include schedule and programmatic. The elements unique to the
public include security, physical, social and time. The unique elements of SMS and
those of the public further highlight that there is a fundamental difference between
the two risk derivation processes. The significance of this is that the organization
utilizing SMS must understand what the elements are for both processes, especially
those unique to the public, and address them to win over public support and
minimize public perceived risk.
Third, decoding public risk perception is problematic at best, because it is
affected not only by the six elements discussed earlier, but other major influencing
subjective factors on the individual including (a) lack of trust, (b) amount of control,
(c) individual knowledge and experience of the technology being implemented, (d)
individual norms, (e) individual values, (f) culture theory, (g) cultural factors, (h)
media communication, and (i) gender. It is important to realize from this conclusion
that given the numerous major influencing factors coupled with varying individual
personality characteristics makes stereotyping all public stakeholders is impossible
and influencing public perceived risk very difficult.
Fourth, coupled with these six elements and nine factors, it is essential to
understand diverse risk perceptions of stakeholders using the culture theory and
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various social groups during public acceptance to facilitate implementation even
within the same group. This is significant because it makes understanding
individual public stakeholder perceived risk even more difficult. It also reinforces
the fact that just because people are in a group that has a stated position, does not
mean assumptions can be made about individual perceived risk levels within the
group.
Fifth, changing perceived risk once formed is possible, but very difficult.
There is agreement on the methods to accomplish this which includes using
persuasion or influence versus presenting just factual information, building trust,
and allowing the public to participate in the technology implementation strategy.
However, there is disagreement regarding the effectiveness of media
communication as an effective influencing factor. Clothier et al. (2015), Moussaïd,
M. (2013) and Sanquist et al. (2008) concluded that the media could be a significant
influencing factor. Sjöberg (2000) differed concluding it was not as significant as
other influencing factors. In conjunction with these tools of influence, being
proactive, truthful and understanding to facilitate success are keys to realizing a
fundamental shift from an expert technological fact-based approach to one of a
subjective perception and social acceptance.
Often, experts gauge public perceived risk as false, concluding that it is
based on misunderstanding and ignorance which then creates animosity. The better
approach is to realize public perception once formed, while faulty, is valid in the
public’s eye and that expert risk assessment involves subjectivity and; therefore, is
an estimate only. Thus, organizations implementing risk management strategies
must take the time to empathize and understand to reshape public concerns given
the public trend is becoming more, not less concerned about risk.
It is crucial to have an understanding of SMS derived versus public risk
assessment processes and associated influencing factors. Then, if necessary, to
apply the knowledge and associated methodology to target public stakeholder
perceived risk for either elimination or minimization to facilitate technology
implementation.
Recommendations
This research process highlighted a literature gap in the area of aviation
specific technology acceptance studies. Thus, more perceived risk research is
needed to fill the aviation related literature gap incorporating major influencing
factors. Additionally, there has been much success in applying and validating
technology acceptance models such as the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM),
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the Theory of Planned Behavior Model (TPB) and others in information
technology. Future research should include an adaptation of one or more of these
models for aviation specific technology use. Then, the information in this paper,
along with prior research can be used in conjunction with the new model by
organizations utilizing SMS to eliminate or mitigate public perceived risk to an
acceptable level to enhance aviation technology acceptance.
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